Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
9 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Flarum's patch for CVE-2023-27577 restricted the @import and data-uri() LESS features in the customless setting, but the same restriction was never applied to other settings registered as LESS config variables (for example themeprimarycolor and themesecondarycolor, as well as any key registered via Extend\Settings::registerLessConfigVar()). Those values are interpolated verbatim into the LESS source at compile time, allowing an authenticated administrator to craft a theme-color value that injects an arbitrary @import directive into the compiled forum.css. Because the underlying LESS parser honours @import (inline) '<path', an attacker can read arbitrary files reachable by the PHP process (local file inclusion) or trigger outbound HTTP(S) requests (server-side request forgery). Impact An attacker who has compromised — or legitimately obtained — an administrator account can: - Read arbitrary local files reachable by the PHP process (e.g. /etc/passwd, .env, config files…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.0.0-rc.1 (pre-release) or 1.8.16 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
A session hijacking vulnerability exists when an attacker-controlled authoritative subdomain under a parent domain (e.g., subdomain.host.com) sets cookies scoped to the parent domain (.host.com). This allows session token replacement for applications hosted on sibling subdomains (e.g., community.host.com) if session tokens aren't rotated post-authentication. Key Constraints: - Attacker must control any subdomain under the parent domain (e.g., evil.host.com or x.y.host.com). - Parent domain must not be on the Public Suffix List. Due to non-existent session token rotation after authenticating we can theoretically reproduce the vulnerability by using browser dev tools, but due to the browser's security measures this does not seem to be exploitable as described. --- Proof of Concept (Deno) Attack Flow 1. Attacker Setup: Hosts server at evil.host.com. 2. Harvest Session Token: Attacker visits community.host.com to get a session token for himself to replace the victim's token with…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.8.10 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact The Flarum /logout route includes a redirect parameter that allows any third party to redirect users from a (trusted) domain of the Flarum installation to redirect to any link. Sample: example.com/logout?return=https://google.com. For logged-in users, the logout must be confirmed. Guests are immediately redirected. This could be used by spammers to redirect to a web address using a trusted domain of a running Flarum installation. Some ecosystem extensions modifying the logout route have already been affected. Sample: https://discuss.flarum.org/d/22229-premium-wordpress-integration/526 Patches The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.8.5. All communities running Flarum should upgrade as soon as possible to v1.8.5 using: composer update --prefer-dist --no-dev -a -W You can then confirm you run the latest version using: composer show flarum/core Workarounds Some extensions modifying the logout route can remedy this issue if their implementation is safe. In…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.8.5 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact The Flarum forum software is affected by a vulnerability that allows an attacker to conduct a Blind SSRF attack or disclose any file on the server, even with a basic user account on any Flarum forum. By uploading a file containing a URL and spoofing the MIME type, an attacker can manipulate the application to execute unintended actions. The vulnerability is due to the behavior of the intervention/image package, which attempts to interpret the supplied file contents as a URL, which then fetches its contents. This allows an attacker to exploit the vulnerability to perform SSRF attacks, disclose local file contents, or conduct a blind oracle attack. Patches This has been patched in Flarum v1.8. Workarounds As a temporary workaround for the SSRF aspect of the vulnerability, one can disable PHP's allowurlfopen which will prevent the fetching of external files via URLs. Credits Adam Kues - Assetnote
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.8.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact If an admin account has already been compromised by an attacker, the LESS parser can be exploited to read sensitive files on the server through the use of path traversal techniques. An attacker can achieve this by providing an absolute path to a sensitive file in the custom LESS setting, which the LESS parser will then read. For example, an attacker could use the following code to read the contents of the /etc/passwd file: Patches The vulnerability has been addressed in version 1.7. Users should upgrade to this version to mitigate the vulnerability. Workarounds Users can mitigate the vulnerability by ensuring that their admin accounts are secured with strong passwords and other best practices for account security. Additionally, users can limit the exposure of sensitive files on the server by implementing appropriate file permissions and access controls.
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.7.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
If the first post of a discussion is permanently deleted but the discussion stays visible, any actor who can view the discussion is able to create a new reply via the REST API, no matter the reply permission or lock status. This includes users that don't have a validated email. Guests cannot successfully create a reply because the API will fail with a 500 error when the user ID 0 is inserted into the database. This should also be fixed to return the expected 401/403 status. This happens because when the first post of a discussion is permanently deleted, the firstpostid attribute of the discussion becomes null which causes access control to be skipped for all new replies. Flarum automatically makes discussions with zero comments invisible so an additional condition for this vulnerability is that the discussion must have at least one approved reply so that discussions.commentcount is still above zero after the post deletion. Impact This can open the discussion to uncontrolled spam or…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.6.3 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using the notifications feature, one can read restricted/private content and bypass access checks that would be in place for such content. The notification-sending component does not check that the subject of the notification can be seen by the receiver, and proceeds to send notifications through their different channels. The alerts do not leak data despite this as they are listed based on a visibility check, however, emails are still sent out. This means that, for extensions which restrict access to posts, any actor can bypass the restriction by subscribing to the discussion if the Subscriptions extension is enabled. Impact The attack allows the leaking of some posts in the forum database, including posts awaiting approval, posts in tags the user has no access to if they could subscribe to a discussion before it becomes private, and posts restricted by third-party extensions. Other leaks could also happen for different notification subjects if some features allowed to receive…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.6.3 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Flarum's page title system allowed for page titles to be converted into HTML DOM nodes when pages were rendered. The change was made after v1.5 and was not noticed. This allowed an attacker to inject malicious HTML markup using a discussion title input, either by creating a new discussion or renaming one. The XSS attack occurs after a visitor opens the relevant discussion page. Impact All communities running Flarum from v1.5.0 to v1.6.1 are impacted. Patches The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.6.2. All communities running Flarum from v1.5.0 to v1.6.1 have to upgrade as soon as possible to v1.6.2 using: You can then confirm you run the latest version using: Workarounds None For more information For any questions or comments on this vulnerability please visit https://discuss.flarum.org/d/27558. For support questions create a discussion at https://discuss.flarum.org/t/support. A reminder that if you ever become aware of a security issue in Flarum, please…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.6.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Flarum's translation system allowed for string inputs to be converted into HTML DOM nodes when rendered. This change was made after v0.1.0-beta.16 (our last beta before v1.0.0) and was not noticed or documented. This allowed for any user to type malicious HTML markup within certain user input fields and have this execute on client browsers. The example which led to the discovery of this vulnerability was in the forum search box. Entering faux-malicious HTML markup, such as <scriptalert('test')</script resulted in an alert box appearing on the forum. This attack could also be modified to perform AJAX requests on behalf of a user, possibly deleting discussions, modifying their settings or profile, or even modifying settings on the Admin panel if the attack was targetted towards a privileged user. Impact All Flarum communities that run flarum v1.0.0 or v1.0.1 are impacted. Patches The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.0.2. All communities running Flarum v1.0…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.0.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.