Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
3 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
A session hijacking vulnerability exists when an attacker-controlled authoritative subdomain under a parent domain (e.g., subdomain.host.com) sets cookies scoped to the parent domain (.host.com). This allows session token replacement for applications hosted on sibling subdomains (e.g., community.host.com) if session tokens aren't rotated post-authentication. Key Constraints: - Attacker must control any subdomain under the parent domain (e.g., evil.host.com or x.y.host.com). - Parent domain must not be on the Public Suffix List. Due to non-existent session token rotation after authenticating we can theoretically reproduce the vulnerability by using browser dev tools, but due to the browser's security measures this does not seem to be exploitable as described. --- Proof of Concept (Deno) Attack Flow 1. Attacker Setup: Hosts server at evil.host.com. 2. Harvest Session Token: Attacker visits community.host.com to get a session token for himself to replace the victim's token with…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.8.10 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact The Flarum /logout route includes a redirect parameter that allows any third party to redirect users from a (trusted) domain of the Flarum installation to redirect to any link. Sample: example.com/logout?return=https://google.com. For logged-in users, the logout must be confirmed. Guests are immediately redirected. This could be used by spammers to redirect to a web address using a trusted domain of a running Flarum installation. Some ecosystem extensions modifying the logout route have already been affected. Sample: https://discuss.flarum.org/d/22229-premium-wordpress-integration/526 Patches The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.8.5. All communities running Flarum should upgrade as soon as possible to v1.8.5 using: composer update --prefer-dist --no-dev -a -W You can then confirm you run the latest version using: composer show flarum/core Workarounds Some extensions modifying the logout route can remedy this issue if their implementation is safe. In…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.8.5 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact The Flarum forum software is affected by a vulnerability that allows an attacker to conduct a Blind SSRF attack or disclose any file on the server, even with a basic user account on any Flarum forum. By uploading a file containing a URL and spoofing the MIME type, an attacker can manipulate the application to execute unintended actions. The vulnerability is due to the behavior of the intervention/image package, which attempts to interpret the supplied file contents as a URL, which then fetches its contents. This allows an attacker to exploit the vulnerability to perform SSRF attacks, disclose local file contents, or conduct a blind oracle attack. Patches This has been patched in Flarum v1.8. Workarounds As a temporary workaround for the SSRF aspect of the vulnerability, one can disable PHP's allowurlfopen which will prevent the fetching of external files via URLs. Credits Adam Kues - Assetnote
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.8.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.