Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
6 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Go github.com/siderolabs/omni >= 1.3.0, < 1.6.6; >= 1.7.0, < 1.7.3
Fixed in
1.6.61.7.3· Vendor fix available
Issue
Omni supports importing standalone Talos clusters. During this process, an ImportedClusterSecrets resource is created, which contains the full CA secrets bundle for the cluster being imported. If these secrets are not rotated by the importing actor, an authenticated Omni user with Reader access can read this resource and gain full access to the Talos, Kubernetes and etcd APIs of the cluster. Severity - Attack Vector: Adjacent: the attacker needs to be in the same network to be able to access Talos/Kubernetes APIs with the compromised keys. - Attack Complexity: High: the attacker needs a deep understanding of Omni's internals. The resource is only created for imported clusters, and is normally not represented to users via any high-level API. - Privileges Required: Low: the role Reader is sufficient for the attacker to be able to read an imported cluster's secrets. - User Interaction: Required: another user must have imported a cluster to Omni for this vulnerability to exist. -…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.7.3 or 1.6.6 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Go github.com/siderolabs/omni < 1.6.6; >= 1.7.0, < 1.7.3
Fixed in
1.6.61.7.3· Vendor fix available
Issue
managementServer.CreateSchematic (internal/backend/grpc/schematics.go) passes the caller-controlled TalosVersion field directly to imageFactoryClient.OverlaysVersions, which embeds it verbatim into a fmt.Sprintf("/version/%s/overlays/official", talosVersion) path template. url.URL.JoinPath resolves any ../ sequences in that path, allowing an authenticated Operator to rewrite the URL path and force Omni to issue HTTP GET requests to unintended paths on the configured image-factory server. Error body content from those unintended endpoints is returned to the caller. Severity - Attack Vector: Network: exploited via the gRPC CreateSchematic API endpoint. - Attack Complexity: Low: once the attacker holds an Operator credential and has identified a media ID with an overlay, exploitation is a single API call. - Privileges Required: High: role.Operator is required, which has administrative capabilities on Omni. - User Interaction: None. - Scope: Unchanged: the traversal is…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.7.3 or 1.6.6 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Go github.com/siderolabs/omni < 1.6.6; >= 1.7.0, < 1.7.3
Fixed in
1.6.61.7.3· Vendor fix available
Issue
SAML.getSession (internal/pkg/auth/interceptor/saml.go) checks the Used flag on a SAMLAssertion resource and then marks it used in two separate state operations. Because the check and the update are not atomic, concurrent requests carrying the same saml-session token can both observe Used == false, both pass validation, and both return a successful authentication context. An attacker who obtains a valid saml-session token can exploit this window to authenticate as the token's owner multiple times, defeating the one-time-use guarantee. Severity - Attack Vector: Local: the attacker needs to either be able to intercept the local, unencrypted traffic or needs access to user's browser. - Attack Complexity: High: the attacker must first obtain a valid saml-session token belonging to the victim (requires a separate interception step; the token is ephemeral and single-use by design). - Privileges Required: None: no Omni account is required to carry out the race once the session token…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.7.3 or 1.6.6 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Go github.com/siderolabs/omni >= 1.1.0-beta.0, <= 1.1.4; <= 1.0.1
Fixed in
1.1.51.0.2· Vendor fix available
Issue
Impact Omni might leak sensitive information via an API. Patches v1.1.5, v1.0.2 and v1.2.0 contain the patch. Workarounds None. References None.
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.1.5 or 1.0.2 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Go github.com/siderolabs/omni >= 1.1.0-beta.0, <= 1.1.4; <= 1.0.1
Fixed in
1.1.51.0.2· Vendor fix available
Issue
A nil pointer dereference vulnerability in the Omni Resource Service allows unauthenticated users to cause a server panic and denial of service by sending empty create/update resource requests through the API endpoints. Details The vulnerability exists in the isSensitiveSpec function which calls grpcomni.CreateResource without checking if the resource's metadata field is nil. When a resource is created with an empty Metadata field, the CreateResource function attempts to access resource.Metadata.Version causing a segmentation fault. Vulnerable Code The isSensitiveSpec function in /src/internal/backend/server.go: The CreateResource function expects resource.Metadata to be non-nil: The UpdateResource function has the same issue - it also calls CreateResource internally and expects resource.Metadata to be non-nil: Affected Endpoints - resourceServerCreate - Create Resource API endpoint - resourceServerUpdate - Update Resource API endpoint Both endpoints call isSensitiveSpec…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.1.5 or 1.0.2 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Omni and each Talos machine establish a peer-to-peer (P2P) SideroLink connection using WireGuard to mutually authenticate and authorize access. In this setup, Omni assigns a random IPv6 address to each Talos machine from a /64 network block. Omni itself uses the fixed ::1 address within that same block. From Omni's perspective, this is a WireGuard interface with multiple peers, where each peer corresponds to a Talos machine. The WireGuard interface on Omni is configured to ensure that the source IP address of an incoming packet matches the IPv6 address assigned to the Talos peer. However, it performs no validation on the packet's destination address. The Talos end of the SideroLink connection cannot be considered a trusted environment. Workloads running on Kubernetes, especially those configured with host networking, could gain direct access to this link. Therefore, a malicious workload could theoretically send arbitrary packets over the SideroLink interface. --- Impact This…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.48.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.