Omni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.6 · CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS

• CVE-2026-45726: 0.14% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 3.33 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Omni supports importing standalone Talos clusters. During this process, an ImportedClusterSecrets resource is created, which contains the full CA secrets bundle for the cluster being imported. If these secrets are not rotated by the importing actor, an authenticated Omni user with Reader access can read this resource and gain full access to the Talos, Kubernetes and etcd APIs of the cluster. Severity - Attack Vector: Adjacent: the attacker needs to be in the same network to be able to access Talos/Kubernetes APIs with the compromised keys. - Attack Complexity: High: the attacker needs a deep understanding of Omni's internals. The resource is only created for imported clusters, and is normally not represented to users via any high-level API. - Privileges Required: Low: the role Reader is sufficient for the attacker to be able to read an imported cluster's secrets. - User Interaction: Required: another user must have imported a cluster to Omni for this vulnerability to exist. -…

Published by the source

5 Jun 2026, 15:26 UTC

Last modified by the source

5 Jun 2026, 15:26 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:23 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-wv8c-6mx2-xf4j

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-45726

Advisory: Omni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService
IDs: CVE-2026-45726, GHSA-wv8c-6mx2-xf4j
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-45726 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:23 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.6)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/siderolabs/omni 1.7.3, 1.6.6. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/siderolabs/omni: affected >= 1.3.0, < 1.6.6; >= 1.7.0, < 1.7.3; fixed in 1.6.6, 1.7.3

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/siderolabs/omni: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/siderolabs/omni.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wv8c-6mx2-xf4j (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-wv8c-6mx2-xf4j lists affected ranges: Go github.com/siderolabs/omni >=1.3.0 =1.7.0 <1.7.3)

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