Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
4 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run any version of zebrad up to and including v4.4.1. 2. Your node validates blocks on mainnet, testnet, or any network where both Zebra and zcashd nodes participate. All default configurations are affected. No feature flags, non-default settings, or special build options are required. Summary Zebra's P2SH sigop counter uses a pure-Rust code path that short-circuits on disabled opcodes (such as OPCODESEPARATOR), returning a partial count of zero for any sigops following the disabled opcode. The reference implementation (zcashd) correctly counts through disabled opcodes in its static sigop analysis. This produces a consensus divergence: Zebra accepts blocks that zcashd rejects when the block-wide MAXBLOCKSIGOPS = 20,000 threshold is crossed on one side but not the other. An attacker can exploit this without mining capability. Broadcasting transactions that spend P2SH outputs with malicious redeem scripts is sufficient; any Zebra miner who…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 7.0.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Consensus Divergence in V5 Transparent SIGHASHSINGLE With No Corresponding Output Summary Zebra failed to enforce a ZIP-244 consensus rule for V5 transparent transactions: when an input is signed with SIGHASHSINGLE and there is no transparent output at the same index as that input, validation must fail. Zebra instead asked the underlying sighash library to compute a digest, and that library produced a digest over an empty output set rather than failing. An attacker could craft a V5 transaction with more transparent inputs than outputs that Zebra accepts but zcashd rejects, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. A previous fix (GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp) addressed a closely related case in the same area of the code, but did not cover this specific one. Severity Critical - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes. Note that the impact…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 6.0.1 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
CVE-2026-44497: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling due to Stale Buffer Summary The fix for https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj introduced a separate issue due to insuficient error handling of the case where the sighash type is invalid, during sighash computation. Instead of returning an error, the normal flow would resume, and the input sighash buffer would be left untouched. In scenarios where a previous signature validation could leave a valid sighash in the buffer, an invalid hash-type could be incorrectly accepted, which would create a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. Severity Critical - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes. Note that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run zcashd. Affected Versions Zebra 4.3.1.…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 6.0.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
CVE-2026-41583: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling Summary After a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. Severity Critical - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes. Note that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run zcashd. Affected Versions All Zebra versions prior to…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 5.0.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.