Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
6 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Impact A maliciously modified message can be passed to either openpgp.verify or openpgp.decrypt, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using openpgp.verify) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using openpgp.decrypt with verificationKeys) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words. any…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 6.1.1 or 5.11.3 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact OpenPGP Cleartext Signed Messages are cryptographically signed messages where the signed text is readable without special tools: These messages typically contain a "Hash: ..." header declaring the hash algorithm used to compute the signature digest. OpenPGP.js up to v5.9.0 ignored any data preceding the "Hash: ..." texts when verifying the signature. As a result, malicious parties could add arbitrary text to a third-party Cleartext Signed Message, to lead the victim to believe that the arbitrary text was signed. A user or application is vulnerable to said attack vector if it verifies the CleartextMessage by only checking the returned verified property, discarding the associated data information, and instead visually trusting the contents of the original message: Since verificationResult.data would always contain the actual signed data, users and apps that check this information are not vulnerable. Similarly, given a CleartextMessage object, retrieving the data using getText()…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 5.10.1 or 4.10.11 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
s2k.js in OpenPGP.js will decrypt arbitrary messages regardless of passphrase for crafted PGP keys which allows remote attackers to bypass authentication if message decryption is used as an authentication mechanism via a crafted symmetrically encrypted PGP message.
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.3.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Versions of openpgp prior to 4.3.0 are vulnerable to an Invalid Curve Attack. The package's implementation of ECDH fails to verify the validity of the communication partner's public key. The package calculates the resulting key secret based on an altered curve instead of the specified elliptic curve. Attackers may exfiltrate the victim's private key by choosing the altered curve. An attack requires the attacker being able to initiate message decryption and record the result. Furthermore the victim's key must offer an ECDH public key. Recommendation Upgrade to version 4.3.0 or later. If you are upgrading from a version <4.0.0 it is highly recommended to read the High-Level API Changes section of the openpgp 4.0.0 release: https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v4.0.0
Recommended action: Upgrade to 4.3.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Versions of openpgp prior to 4.2.0 are vulnerable to Message Signature Bypass. The package fails to verify that a message signature is of type text. This allows an attacker to to construct a message with a signature type that only verifies subpackets without additional input (such as standalone or timestamp). For example, an attacker that captures a standalone signature packet from a victim can construct arbitrary signed messages that would be verified correctly. Recommendation Upgrade to version 4.2.0 or later. If you are upgrading from a version <4.0.0 it is highly recommended to read the High-Level API Changes section of the openpgp 4.0.0 release: https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v4.0.0
Recommended action: Upgrade to 4.2.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Versions of openpgp prior to 4.2.0 are vulnerable to Improper Key Verification. The OpenPGP standard allows signature packets to have subpackets which may be hashed or unhashed. Unhashed subpackets are not cryptographically protected and cannot be trusted. The openpgp package does not verify whether a subpacket is hashed. Furthermore, due to the order of parsing a signature packet information from unhashed subpackets overwrites information from hashed subpackets. This may allow an attacker to modify the contents of a key certification signature or revocation signature. Doing so could convince a victim to use an obsolete key for encryption. An attack require a victim to import a manipulated key or update an existing key with a manipulated version. Recommendation Upgrade to version 4.2.0 or later. If you are upgrading from a version <4.0.0 it is highly recommended to read the High-Level API Changes section of the openpgp 4.0.0 release:…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 4.2.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.