Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
3 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Impact Due to a special entry being appended to sys.path during the bootstrap process of a PyInstaller-frozen application, and due to the bootstrap script attempting to load an optional module for bytecode decryption while this entry is still present in sys.path, an application built with PyInstaller < 6.0.0 may be tricked by an unprivileged attacker into executing arbitrary python code when all of the following conditions are met: 1. Application is built with PyInstaller < 6.0.0; both onedir and onefile mode are affected. 2. Optional bytecode encryption code feature was not enabled during the application build. 3. The attacker can create files/directories in the same directory where the executable is located. 4. The filesystem supports creation of files/directories that contain ? in their name (i.e., non-Windows systems). 5. The attacker is able to determine the offset at which the PYZ archive is embedded in the executable. The attacker can create a directory (or a zip archive) next…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 6.0.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact A PyInstaller built application, elevated as a privileged process, may be tricked by an unprivileged attacker into deleting files the unprivileged user does not otherwise have access to. A user is affected if all the following are satisfied: The user runs an application containing either matplotlib or win32com. The application is ran as administrator (or at least a user with higher privileges than the attacker). The user's temporary directory is not locked to that specific user (most likely due to TMP/TEMP environment variables pointing to an unprotected, arbitrary, non default location). Either: - The attacker is able to very carefully time the replacement of a temporary file with a symlink. This switch must occur exactly between shutil.rmtree()'s builtin symlink check and the deletion itself - The application was built with Python 3.7.x or earlier which has no protection against Directory Junctions links Patches The vulnerability has been addressed in…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 5.13.1 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact Local Privilege Escalation in all Windows software frozen by PyInstaller in "onefile" mode. The vulnerability is present only on Windows and in this particular case: If a software frozen by PyInstaller in "onefile" mode is launched by a (privileged) user who has his/her "TempPath" resolving to a world writable directory. This is the case e.g. if the software is launched as a service or as a scheduled task using a system account (in which case TempPath will default to C:\Windows\Temp). In order to be exploitable the software has to be (re)started after the attacker has launched the exploit program. So for a service launched at startup, a service restart is needed (e.g. after a crash or an upgrade). While PyInstaller itself was not vulnerable, all Windows software frozen by PyInstaller in "onefile" mode is vulnerable. CVSSv3 score 7.0 (High) CVSSv3 vector CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Affected - all Windows software frozen by PyInstaller in "onefile" mode No…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 3.6 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.