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2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Impact Two unauthenticated Mollie shop endpoints look up orders by a sequential integer orderId with no ownership or session check. Chained, they expose customer PII. GET /{locale}/thank-you (PageRedirectController::thankYouAction, route syliusmollieshopthankyoupageredirect) loads the order with findOneBy(['id' = $orderId]) and returns a 302 whose Location header carries that order's tokenValue. Any orderId thus yields that order's token. A non-existent id dereferences null and returns a 500. The handler also writes the raw orderId into the session. GET /{locale}/get-code (QrCodeAction::fetchQrCodeFromOrder, route syliusmollieshopgetqrcode) runs the same lookup and returns the order's QR code and id as JSON, ignoring the session cart; this is where the front-end got the integer id. A bad id 500s here too. That tokenValue is the order's only access control. Passed to the Sylius core page GET /{locale}/register-after-checkout/{tokenValue} it returns a form pre-filled with the…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 3.3.1, 3.2.4 or 2.2.8 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact The shop payment webhook POST /{locale}/update-payment (route syliusmollieshoppaymentwebhook) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters: id (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and orderId (the Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order. An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid paid Mollie payment ID, for example from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim orderId. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to completed (or any other Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders. Patches Fixed in versions 2.2.8, 3.2.4 and 3.3.1. The webhook now binds the payment to the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 3.3.1, 3.2.4 or 2.2.8 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.