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3 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Regression: Verification of integratedTime from Rekor V1 Log Entry against Fuclio Certificate validity was missing Details - PR #1008 erroneously removed verification of the integrated (Rekor entry) time) against the Fulcio certificate. - PR #1185 re-added this verification with enhancements that adhere to the Sigstore verification spec. - old sigstore-conformance test for this check was built incorrectly PoC A new bundle was added to sigstore-conformance to test this: sigstore-java:2.0.0 can be tested against it and shown to be unexpectedly passing Verify this bundle against a.txt Impact This vulnerability impacts only users verifying bundles with dev.sigstore:sigstore-java:2.0.0. Older versions are not affected, it is fixed in dev.sigstore:sigstore-java:2.1.0 A malicious actor may exploit this if they were able to access a users system and exfiltrate the temporary private key used during signing and then reuse an old fulcio certificate later without requiring direct access…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.1.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
sigstore-java has insufficient verification for a situation where a bundle provides a invalid signature for a checkpoint. Impact This bug impacts clients using any variation of KeylessVerifier.verify() Currently checkpoints are only used to ensure the root hash of an inclusion proof was provided by the log in question. Failing to validate that means a bundle may provide an inclusion proof that doesn't actually correspond to the log in question. This may eventually lead a monitor/witness being unable to detect when a compromised logs are providing different views of themselves to different clients. There are other mechanisms right now that mitigate this, such as the signed entry timestamp. Sigstore-java currently requires a valid signed entry timestamp. By correctly verifying the signed entry timestamp we can make certain assertions about the log signing the log entry (like the log was aware of the artifact signing event and signed it). Therefore the impact on clients that are…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.2.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
sigstore-java has insufficient verification for a situation where a validly-signed but "mismatched" bundle is presented as proof of inclusion into a transparency log Impact This bug impacts clients using any variation of KeylessVerifier.verify() The verifier may accept a bundle with an unrelated log entry, cryptographically verifying everything but fails to ensure the log entry applies to the artifact in question, thereby "verifying" a bundle without any proof the signing event was logged. This allows the creation of a bundle without fulcio certificate and private key combined with an unrelated but time-correct log entry to fake logging of a signing event. A malicious actor using a compromised identity may want to do this to prevent discovery via rekor's log monitors. The signer's identity will still be available to the verifier. The signature on the bundle must still be on the correct artifact for the verifier to pass. sigstore-gradle-plugin and sigstore-maven-plugin are not…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.1.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.