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2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Fedify previously addressed SSRF/internal network access in GHSA-p9cg-vqcc-grcx by adding public URL validation before runtime document and media fetching. However, the current IPv4 validation logic appears incomplete. The validatePublicUrl() protection relies on isValidPublicIPv4Address() to reject non-public IPv4 destinations. The function blocks common private and local ranges such as 10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12, and 192.168.0.0/16, but it still treats several special-use, reserved, multicast, benchmarking, and carrier-grade NAT IPv4 ranges as valid public destinations. Because this validation is used as an SSRF defense before outbound fetches, this appears to be an incomplete mitigation or bypass class for the previous SSRF issue. I tested this against the current repository code at unreleased version 2.3.0. I used =0.11.2, <=2.2.3 as the suspected affected range because 0.11.2 is listed as a patched version for GHSA-p9cg-vqcc-grcx, and this…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.2.4, 2.1.15 or 2.0.19 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
@fedify/fedify follows HTTP redirects recursively in its remote document loader and authenticated document loader without enforcing a maximum redirect count or visited-URL loop detection. An attacker who controls a remote ActivityPub key or actor URL can force a server using Fedify to make repeated outbound requests from a single inbound request, leading to resource consumption and denial of service. Details Fedify verifies ActivityPub HTTP signatures by fetching the remote keyId during request processing. The relevant flow is handleInboxInternal() - verifyRequest() - fetchKeyInternal() - document loader. In affected versions: - the generic document loader recursively follows 3xx responses by calling load() again on the Location header - the authenticated redirect path (doubleKnock()) also recursively follows redirects - neither path enforces a redirect cap or tracks visited URLs to detect self-referential redirect loops As a result, if an attacker-controlled keyId or actor…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.1.1 or 2.0.8 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.