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PyPI package

sigstore

Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.

Open advisories

2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.

  1. UnratedPyPIAmendedPublished

    sigstore CSRF possibility in OIDC authentication during signing

    CVE-2026-24408 · GHSA-hm8f-75xx-w2vr

    Affected
    • PyPI sigstore < 4.2.0
    Fixed in
    4.2.0· Vendor fix available
    Issue
    The sigstore-python OAuth authentication flow is susceptible to Cross-Site Request Forgery. Details OAuthSession creates a unique "state" and sends it as a parameter in the authentication request but the "state" in the server response seems not not be cross-checked with this value. Fix should be fairly trivial. Impact This should be low impact: A man-in-the middle attacker could trick a sigstore-python user into signing something with an identity controlled by the attacker (by returning the response to an authentication request they created). This would be quite confusing but not dangerous.

    Recommended action: Upgrade to 4.2.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.

    Sources:osv.dev (1)github.com (2)Source checked Evidence →
  2. Low, CVSS 2.7PyPIAmendedPublished

    sigstore has insufficient validation of integration timestamp during verification

    CVE-2024-55655 · GHSA-hhfg-fwrw-87w7

    Affected
    • PyPI sigstore >= 2.0.0, < 3.6.0
    Fixed in
    3.6.0· Vendor fix available
    Issue
    Versions of sigstore-python newer than 2.0.0 but prior to 3.6.0 perform insufficient validation of the "integration time" present in "v2" and "v3" bundles during the verification flow: the "integration time" is verified if a source of signed time (such as an inclusion promise) is present, but is otherwise trusted if no source of signed time is present. This does not affect "v1" bundles, as the "v1" bundle format always requires an inclusion promise. Details Sigstore uses signed time to support verification of signatures made against short-lived signing keys. Impact The impact and severity of this weakness is low, as Sigstore contains multiple other enforcing components that prevent an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp within a bundle from impersonating a valid signature. In particular, an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp can induce a Denial of Service, but in no different manner than already possible with bundle access (e.g. modifying the…

    Recommended action: Upgrade to 3.6.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.

    Sources:osv.dev (1)github.com (2)Source checked Evidence →