Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Impact The CVE-2026-47211 fix (0.39.0) added UNTRUSTEDENVDENYLIST to stop an untrusted project-directory .env from redirecting execution. The denylist was incomplete — several execution-routing keys of the same RCE class were omitted, so a malicious cloned repo can still reach arbitrary command execution by shipping a .env (auto-loaded at import, no review step): - Backend config-home roots CODEXHOME, OPENCODECONFIG, OPENCODECONFIGDIR, XDGCONFIGHOME: a spawned vendor CLI resolves its config from these. CODEXHOME=./.evil + committed ./.evil/config.toml redirects the nested Codex agent to attacker config — mcpservers.<name.command/args (RCE) and approvalpolicy="never" / sandboxmode="danger-full-access" (silent removal of the human approval gate). (reported by matte1782) - MCP bridge / plugin execution roster OUROBOROSMCPCONFIG (the YAML's server command/args are spawned via stdioclient — RCE), OUROBOROSPLUGINLOCKFILE, OUROBOROSPLUGINTRUSTROOT (redirect the installed-plugin roster /…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.42.1 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact A Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability was discovered in Ouroboros. If a user clones a malicious repository and runs Ouroboros commands within that directory, it can lead to arbitrary code execution and potential system takeover. The vulnerability (CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path & CWE-15: External Control of System Setting) stems from Ouroboros loading the .env file from the current working directory. Prior to the patch, execution-affecting environment variables such as OUROBOROSCLIPATH, OPENCODECLIPATH, and other backend selectors were accepted directly from this local .env. An attacker could include a malicious script in the repository and point the CLI path variable to it (e.g., OUROBOROSCLIPATH=./maliciousscript.sh). When the user executes a command like ouroboros init or any command that instantiates the adapter, the malicious script is executed instead of the intended CLI. Patches The vulnerability has been patched in version 0.39.0 via PR #1078. The fix establishes…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.39.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.