Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
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2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Before Langflow 1.10.3, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever command / args a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in bash -c "exec {command} ...". Any user able to reach the MCP server settings ("Settings → MCP Servers → Add MCP Server", POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{servername}) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a "server" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (touch, rm -rf, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) — even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start. With the default LANGFLOWAUTOLOGIN=true, GET /api/v1/autologin hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. AUTOLOGIN is documented as a development-only setting; with it…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.10.3 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Before Langflow 1.10.3, several built-in components sent server-side HTTP requests to URLs the flow author controls, with no SSRF enforcement. An authenticated user who can build or run flows could make the Langflow server reach loopback, RFC 1918 / private networks, link-local addresses and cloud metadata endpoints (for example http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/), and in many cases read the response back through the component output. Two things combined to cause this: 1. Protection disabled / warn-only. The SSRF guard (lfx/utils/ssrfprotection.py, added in 1.7.0 by #10544) shipped with ssrfprotectionenabled = False, and its only caller, the API Request component, called validateurlforssrf(url, warnonly=True). So even with protection turned on, blocked URLs were only logged. 2. Inconsistent coverage. Other components that take a user-supplied URL or base URL did not call the guard at all: RSS Reader, SearXNG, Web Search (fetching result / RSS URLs), Home Assistant,…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.10.3 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.