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Critical, CVSS 9.9amended

Langflow: OS command injection (RCE) via arbitrary command in MCP stdio server configuration

CVE-2026-105697GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (langflow-base 0.10.3; lfx 1.10.3; langflow 1.10.3), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • PyPI langflow-base

    Affected
    >= 0.1.2, < 0.10.3
    Fixed in
    0.10.3

  • PyPI lfx

    Affected
    < 1.10.3
    Fixed in
    1.10.3

  • PyPI langflow

    Affected
    >= 1.1.2, < 1.10.3
    Fixed in
    1.10.3

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
9.9 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-105697: 0.95% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 61.25 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Before Langflow 1.10.3, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever command / args a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in bash -c "exec {command} ...". Any user able to reach the MCP server settings ("Settings → MCP Servers → Add MCP Server", POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{servername}) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a "server" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (touch, rm -rf, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) — even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start. With the default LANGFLOWAUTOLOGIN=true, GET /api/v1/autologin hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. AUTOLOGIN is documented as a development-only setting; with it…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-105697

Advisory: Langflow: OS command injection (RCE) via arbitrary command in MCP stdio server configuration
IDs: CVE-2026-105697, GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-105697 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:55 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: langflow-base 0.10.3; lfx 1.10.3; langflow 1.10.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI langflow-base: affected >= 0.1.2, < 0.10.3; fixed in 0.10.3
- PyPI lfx: affected < 1.10.3; fixed in 1.10.3
- PyPI langflow: affected >= 1.1.2, < 1.10.3; fixed in 1.10.3

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show langflow-base`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.
- `python -m pip show lfx`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.
- `python -m pip show langflow`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on langflow-base, lfx, langflow.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45 lists affected ranges: PyPI langflow >=1.1.2 =0.1.2 =0 <1.10.3)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45 (OSV record GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45 lists affected ranges: PyPI langflow >=1.1.2 =0.1.2 =0 <1.10.3 (fixed))

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