Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
XML nodes encrypted with either aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, or aes-256-gcm lack validation of the authentication tag length. An attacker can use this to brute-force an authentication tag, recover the GHASH key, and decrypt the encrypted nodes. It also allows to forge arbitrary ciphertexts without knowing the encryption key. Details When decrypting with either aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, or aes-256-gcm here, the $authTag is set from a substr(), but never has its length validated (it should be validated with something like strlen($authTag) == self::AUTHTAGLENGTH). For that reason, a shorter than expected data blob will allow for the $authTag to have as short a tag as only one byte (see PHP's documentation%20has%20been%20called.%20Otherwise%20the%20decryption%20may%20succeed%20if%20the%20given%20tag%20only%20matches%20the%20start%20of%20the%20proper%20tag.)). See this example: With a legit ciphertext in hand, this is enough to recover the GHASH key. With that key, any authenticated…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.3.1 or 1.13.9 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Validation of an XML Signature requires verification that the hash value of the related XML-document (after any optional transformations and/or normalizations) matches a specific DigestValue-value, but also that the cryptografic signature on the SignedInfo-tree (the one that contains the DigestValue) verifies and matches a trusted public key. Within the simpleSAMLphp/xml-security library (https://github.com/simplesamlphp/xml-security), the hash is being validated using SignedElementTrait::validateReference, and the signature is being verified in SignedElementTrait::verifyInternal https://github.com/simplesamlphp/xml-security/blob/master/src/XML/SignedElementTrait.php: What stands out is that the signature is being calculated over the canonical version of the SignedInfo-tree. The validateReference method, however, uses the original non-canonicalized version of SignedInfo. Impact If an attacker somehow (i.e. by exploiting a bug in PHP's canonicalization function) manages to manipulate…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.6.12 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.