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2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
ArchiveUtils.untar(InputStream, Path) and ArchiveUtils.unzip(InputStream, Path) in land.oras:oras-java-sdk create symbolic-link entries from an archive without validating the symlink target. A malicious tar (or zip) shipped as an OCI layer blob can place a symlink under the extraction directory whose target points outside that directory, then ship a regular-file entry whose path traverses through that symlink. The subsequent Files.newOutputStream call follows the symlink and writes the file outside the caller's chosen target directory. This bypasses the existing ensureSafeEntry containment check, which only validates entry.getName() and not entry.getLinkName(). Reachable from the public Registry.pullArtifact / OCILayout.pullArtifact API whenever the manifest layer carries io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true, and from any direct caller of ArchiveUtils.untar / ArchiveUtils.uncompressuntar (e.g. consumers that pull an archive blob and extract it themselves, such as…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.6.4 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
The pullArtifact methods in Registry and OCILayout use the org.opencontainers.image.title annotation from a pulled manifest as a filename, resolving it against the caller supplied output directory without normalization or a containment check. A manifest publisher can set this annotation to a path that escapes the output directory, causing the SDK to write the layer's blob anywhere the JVM process can write. Details Two call sites are affected. src/main/java/land/oras/Registry.java, pullLayer (reached from Registry.pullArtifact): src/main/java/land/oras/OCILayout.java, OCILayout.pullArtifact: The annotation comes from the remote manifest. Path.resolve treats an absolute argument as a full override of the base, and follows .. segments upward, so the annotation controls the destination. REPLACEEXISTING overwrites files that exist at that destination. The unpack branch of pullLayer (taken when the layer carries io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true) is not affected, because it…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.6.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.