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Go github.com/refraction-networking/utls >= 1.6.0, < 1.8.2
Fixed in
1.8.2· Vendor fix available
Issue
The padding extension was incorrectly removed in utls for the non-pq variant of Chrome 120 fingerprint. Chrome removed this extension only when sending pq keyshares. Only this fingerprint is affected since newer fingerprints have pq keyshares by default and older fingerprints have this extension. Affected symbols: HelloChrome120 Fix commit: 8fe0b08e9a0e7e2d08b268f451f2c79962e6acd0 Thanks to telegram @acgdaily for reporting this issue.
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.8.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Go github.com/refraction-networking/utls >= 1.6.0, < 1.8.1
Fixed in
1.8.1· Vendor fix available
Issue
There is a fingerprint mismatch with Chrome when using GREASE ECH, having to do with ciphersuite selection. When Chrome selects the preferred ciphersuite in the outer ClientHello and the ciphersuite for ECH, it does so consistently based on hardware support. That means, for example, if it prefers AES for the outer ciphersuite, it would also use AES for ECH. The Chrome parrot in utls hardcodes AES preference for outer ciphersuites but selects the ECH ciphersuite randomly between AES and ChaCha20. So there is a 50% chance of selecting ChaCha20 for ECH while using AES for the outer ciphersuite, which is impossible in Chrome. This is only a problem in GREASE ECH, since in real ECH Chrome selects the first valid ciphersuite when AES is preferred, which is the same in utls. So no change is done there. Affected symbols: HelloChrome120, HelloChrome120PQ, HelloChrome131, HelloChrome133 Fix commit: 24bd1e05a788c1add7f3037f4532ea552b2cee07 Thanks to telegram @acgdaily for reporting this issue.
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.8.1 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Before version 1.7.0, utls did not implement the TLS 1.3 downgrade protection mechanism specified in RFC 8446 Section 4.1.3 when using a utls ClientHello spec. This allowed an active network adversary to downgrade TLS 1.3 connections initiated by a utls client to a lower TLS version (e.g., TLS 1.2) by modifying the ClientHello message to exclude the SupportedVersions extension, causing the server to respond with a TLS 1.2 ServerHello (along with a downgrade canary in the ServerHello random field). Because utls did not check the downgrade canary in the ServerHello random field, clients would accept the downgraded connection without detecting the attack. This attack could also be used by an active network attacker to fingerprint utls connections. Fix Commit or Pull Request refraction-networking/utls#337, specifically refraction-networking/utls@f8892761e2a4d29054264651d3a86fda83bc83f9 References - https://github.com/refraction-networking/utls/issues/181
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.7.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.