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3 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
The Rust implementation of Yamux can panic when processing a crafted inbound Data frame that sets SYN and uses a body length greater than DEFAULTCREDIT (e.g. 262145). On the first packet of a new inbound stream, stream state is created and a receiver is queued before oversized-body validation completes. When validation fails, the temporary stream is dropped and cleanup may call remove(...).expect("stream not found"), triggering a panic in the connection state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal Yamux session and does not require authentication. kind of vulnerability is it? Who is Attack Scenario An attacker that can establish a Yamux session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single validly encoded Yamux Data|SYN frame with an oversized body: 1. Establish a standard authenticated transport session that negotiates Yamux. 2. Send one Yamux frame with: - Tag = Data - Flags = SYN - StreamId = 1 (or any new inbound stream id) - Length =…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.13.10 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Sumary The Rust implementation of Yamux accepts WindowUpdate credit values from the remote peer and applies them to per-stream send-window state. A specially crafted WindowUpdate can cause arithmetic overflow in send-window accounting, which triggers a panic in the connection state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal network connection and does not require authentication. Attack Scenario An attacker that can establish a Yamux session with a target node can crash the target by sending two validly encoded Yamux frames: 1. Open a stream (e.g. DATA + SYN) so the stream exists with initial send-window state (DEFAULTCREDIT). 2. Send a WindowUpdate on that stream with a very large credit value (e.g. 0xFFFF0000) such that adding credit to the current send-window overflows u32. Impact Remote unauthenticated denial of service. An attacker can repeatedly trigger panics by reconnecting and replaying the crafted frame sequence. Patches Users should upgrade to yamux v0.13.9 This…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.13.9 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Attack scenario The Rust implementation of the Yamux stream multiplexer uses a vector for pending frames. This vector is not bounded in length. Every time the Yamux protocol requires sending of a new frame, this frame gets appended to this vector. This can be remotely triggered in a number of ways, for example by: 1. Opening a new libp2p Identify stream. This causes the node to send its Identify message. Of course, every other protocol that causes the sending of data also works. The larger the response, the more data is enqueued. 2. Sending a Yamux Ping frame. This causes a Pong frame to be enqueued. Under normal circumstances, this queue of pending frames would be drained once they’re sent out over the network. However, the attacker can use TCP’s receive window mechanism to prevent the victim from sending out any data: By not reading from the TCP connection, the receive window will never be increased, and the victim won’t be able to send out any new data (this is how TCP…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.13.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.