Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Impact Following the path-safety patches in GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 (v0.1.2), a comprehensive multi-angle audit surfaced five further vulnerabilities, now patched in v0.1.3: 1. sourcesha argument injection in git ls-tree (CRITICAL). InstalledSkill.sourcesha deserialized from .skills.toml (committed, PR-mergeable) flowed unvalidated into git ls-tree -r -z <refspec -- <path. Because the refspec sits before --, an attacker who slipped a malicious .skills.toml into a PR could set sourcesha = "--name-only" / --abbrev=0 / --output=… and corrupt the diff classifier (which drives pull / push destructive decisions), or forge a divergence state to trick push --on-divergence overwrite into clobbering the wrong content. 2. FIFO / device / socket denial-of-service in copydirall (CRITICAL). The file-type branch only checked isdir() / issymlink(); a FIFO inside a skill folder fell through to fs::copy, which blocks indefinitely waiting for a writer. A character device like /dev/zero would read until…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.1.3 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact skillctl 0.1.0 and 0.1.1 contained four path-safety vulnerabilities that, in combination, allowed an attacker to: 1. Exfiltrate arbitrary files on the operator's machine by publishing a malicious skills library containing a symlink inside a skill folder (e.g. niania → /home/user/.aws/credentials). The symlink fell through entry.filetype().isdir() in fsutil::copydirall, was dereferenced by fs::copy, and the target's content was copied into the project. A subsequent skillctl push would have published the secret to the (possibly public) library — what the reporter called "round-trip path exfiltration". 2. Delete arbitrary directories outside the project or library root by crafting a .skills.toml with a malicious destination or sourcepath field. Both were deserialized as PathBuf with zero validation. Because Path::join lets an absolute right-hand side replace the base, destination = "/home/user/.ssh" made cwd.join(...) resolve outside the project; .. traversal was equally…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.1.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.