skillctl: Path traversal and symlink-follow in skillctl allow arbitrary file disclosure and deletion

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

7.1 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact skillctl 0.1.0 and 0.1.1 contained four path-safety vulnerabilities that, in combination, allowed an attacker to: 1. Exfiltrate arbitrary files on the operator's machine by publishing a malicious skills library containing a symlink inside a skill folder (e.g. niania → /home/user/.aws/credentials). The symlink fell through entry.filetype().isdir() in fsutil::copydirall, was dereferenced by fs::copy, and the target's content was copied into the project. A subsequent skillctl push would have published the secret to the (possibly public) library — what the reporter called "round-trip path exfiltration". 2. Delete arbitrary directories outside the project or library root by crafting a .skills.toml with a malicious destination or sourcepath field. Both were deserialized as PathBuf with zero validation. Because Path::join lets an absolute right-hand side replace the base, destination = "/home/user/.ssh" made cwd.join(...) resolve outside the project; .. traversal was equally…

Published by the source

5 Jun 2026, 19:43 UTC

Last modified by the source

5 Jun 2026, 19:46 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47

Advisory: skillctl: Path traversal and symlink-follow in skillctl allow arbitrary file disclosure and deletion
IDs: GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-wx3m-whqv-xv47 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: skillctl 0.1.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io skillctl: affected < 0.1.2; fixed in 0.1.2

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io skillctl: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on skillctl.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 lists affected ranges: crates.io skillctl >=0 <0.1.2)

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