Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
P2PKH has 20 bytes just like P2SH. We protect against revealing P2PKH deposits by manually assembling the expected P2SH script in the smart contract and comparing hashes. However, we missed the case when the attacker embeds a valid P2SH inside of P2PKH as an output script. bitcoin-spv library extracts the P2SH from P2PKH and we treat it as a valid P2SH output. This does not lead to stealing funds but can lead to protocol insolvency. The off-chain client handles this case correctly, but the problem is in the optimistic minting bot. The bot assumes that if the funding TX exists on Bitcoin with the right amount and it was successfully revealed, the transaction is valid. https://bugs.immunefi.com/magnus/672/projects/502/bug-bounty/reports/55982 Steps Since there is a 24-hour governance delay on upgrading the Bridge smart contract, we are going to pause optimistic minting. 1. Pause optimistic minting. 2. Deploy new Bridge implementation with Deposit library containing a fix,…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.8.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
By publishing specially crafted transactions on the Bitcoin blockchain, the SPV maintainer can produce seemingly valid SPV proofs for fraudulent transactions. The issue was originally identified by Least Authority in the tBTC Bridge V2 Security Audit Report as Issue B: Bitcoin SPV Merkle Proofs Can Be Faked. A mitigation was believed to have been in place, but this turned out to contain an error, and the issue had not been effectively mitigated. Details This is achieved by creating a 64-byte transaction that the fraudulent transaction treats as a node in its merkle proof: The attacker creates the malicious transaction E and calculates an unusual but valid transaction D, so that the last 32 bytes of D are a part of the merkle proof of E: foo and bar are arbitrary 32-byte values selected to facilitate this attack. The attacker can then publish D and wait for it to be mined. A valid SPV proof for D can then be transformed into a proof for E by prepending bar and foo to the…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.5.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.