@keep-network/tbtc-v2 revealing P2PKH deposit with a wrapped P2SH script

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Overview P2PKH has 20 bytes just like P2SH. We protect against revealing P2PKH deposits by manually assembling the expected P2SH script in the smart contract and comparing hashes. However, we missed the case when the attacker embeds a valid P2SH inside of P2PKH as an output script. bitcoin-spv library extracts the P2SH from P2PKH and we treat it as a valid P2SH output. This does not lead to stealing funds but can lead to protocol insolvency. The off-chain client handles this case correctly, but the problem is in the optimistic minting bot. The bot assumes that if the funding TX exists on Bitcoin with the right amount and it was successfully revealed, the transaction is valid. https://bugs.immunefi.com/magnus/672/projects/502/bug-bounty/reports/55982 Steps Since there is a 24-hour governance delay on upgrading the Bridge smart contract, we are going to pause optimistic minting. 1. Pause optimistic minting. 2. Deploy new Bridge implementation with Deposit library containing a fix,…

Published by the source

2 Mar 2026, 22:09 UTC

Last modified by the source

4 Mar 2026, 15:13 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 12:42 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-8986-v76q-8vr2

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-8986-v76q-8vr2

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-8986-v76q-8vr2

Advisory: @keep-network/tbtc-v2 revealing P2PKH deposit with a wrapped P2SH script
IDs: GHSA-8986-v76q-8vr2
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-8986-v76q-8vr2 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @keep-network/tbtc-v2 1.8.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @keep-network/tbtc-v2: affected <= 1.8.1; fixed in 1.8.2

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @keep-network/tbtc-v2 --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @keep-network/tbtc-v2.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8986-v76q-8vr2 (OSV record GHSA-8986-v76q-8vr2 lists affected ranges: npm @keep-network/tbtc-v2 >=0 <1.8.2 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8986-v76q-8vr2 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-8986-v76q-8vr2 lists affected ranges: npm @keep-network/tbtc-v2 >=0 <=1.8.1)

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