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3 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
@fastify/reply-from and @fastify/http-proxy process the client's Connection header after the proxy has added its own headers via rewriteRequestHeaders. This allows attackers to retroactively strip proxy-added headers (like access control or identification headers) from upstream requests by listing them in the Connection header value. This affects applications using these plugins with custom header injection for routing, access control, or security purposes. Details The vulnerability exists in @fastify/reply-from/lib/request.js at lines 128-136 (HTTP/1.1 handler) and lines 191-200 (undici handler). The processing flow is: 1. Client headers are copied including the connection header (@fastify/reply-from/index.js line 91) 2. The proxy adds custom headers via rewriteRequestHeaders (line 151) 3. During request construction, the transport handlers read the client's Connection header and strip any headers listed in it 4. This stripping happens after rewriteRequestHeaders, allowing…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 12.6.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
By crafting a malicious URL, an attacker could access routes that are not allowed, even though the reply.from is defined for specific routes in @fastify/reply-from. Details An attacker can bypass the route defined by the @fastify/reply-from package by adding a .. symbol, which, for curl version 8.7.1, is %2e%2e. Impact Everyone is using this package with the routes option to protect a 3rd-party resource.
Recommended action: Upgrade to 12.5.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact The main repo of fastify use fast-content-type-parse to parse request Content-Type, which will trim after split. The fastify-reply-from have not use this repo to unify the parse of Content-Type, which won't trim. As a result, a reverse proxy server built with @fastify/reply-from could misinterpret the incoming body by passing an header ContentType: application/json ; charset=utf-8. This can lead to bypass of security checks. Patches @fastify/reply-from v9.6.0 include the fix. Workarounds There are no known workarounds. References Hackerone Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/2295770.
Recommended action: Upgrade to 9.6.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.