BIP-322 address ownership verification bypass for P2WPKH and P2SH-P2WPKH addresses

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

9.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Affected versions of `bip322` accepted a BIP-322 proof created with an attacker-controlled private key as a valid signature for an unrelated victim P2WPKH or P2SH-P2WPKH address, allowing complete authentication bypass in applications using `verify_simple`, `verify_simple_encoded`, `verify_full`, or `verify_full_encoded` as proof that a user controls a Bitcoin address. In `verify_full`, the verifier obtained the public key from the caller-controlled witness and passed it to `verify_full_p2wpkh`, where the supposed public-key mismatch check read the key from the same witness and compared it with itself: ```rust let witness_pub_key = &witness.to_vec()[1]; if &pub_key.to_bytes() != witness_pub_key { return Err(Error::PublicKeyMismatch); } ``` Since `pub_key` was originally parsed from that exact witness element, this comparison was tautological. The code verified that the signature was valid for the public key embedded in the witness, but never verified that this public key hashes to…

Published by the source

14 Aug 2026, 12:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

9 Oct 2026, 08:15 UTC

Source last checked

23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0334

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-5chw-87w3-j9cv

Advisory: BIP-322 address ownership verification bypass for P2WPKH and P2SH-P2WPKH addresses
IDs: GHSA-5chw-87w3-j9cv
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0334 (revision 1, source checked 23 Oct 2026, 22:04 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: bip322 0.0.11. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io bip322: affected >= 0.0.6, < 0.0.11; fixed in 0.0.11

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io bip322: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on bip322.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0334 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0334 lists affected ranges: crates.io bip322 >=0.0.6 <0.0.11 (fixed))

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