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Chosen Ciphertext Attack in Jose4j

GHSA-jgvc-jfgh-rjvv

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (org.bitbucket.b_c:jose4j 0.9.3), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
not scored
EPSS
No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary RSA15 in jose4j is susceptible to chosen ciphertext attacks. The attack allows to decrypt RSA15 or RSAOAEP encrypted ciphertexts. It may be feasible to sign with affected keys. Severity Moderate - exploiting this ciphertext attack could result in the ability to decrypt RSA15 or RSAOAEP encrypted ciphertexts. Proof of Concept A test case that can reproduce the padding oracle uses the following private key: jose4j has distinguishable behvaior for the following test cases: The first ciphertext below contains an invalid PKCS #1 padding. Because of hte invalid padding a random AES key is generated during decryption. This leads to an authentication error. The second ciphertext below ontains valid PKCS #1 padding, but the size of the encoded key is incorrect. Because of this, trying to dcrypt the symmetric part of the ciphertext immediately fails with org.jose4j.lang.JoseException: Invalid key for AES/GCM/NoPadding. A correct implementation would not have distinguishable behavior. A…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-jgvc-jfgh-rjvv

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-jgvc-jfgh-rjvv

Advisory: Chosen Ciphertext Attack in Jose4j
IDs: GHSA-jgvc-jfgh-rjvv
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/ghsa-jgvc-jfgh-rjvv (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 16:11 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: org.bitbucket.b_c:jose4j 0.9.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Maven org.bitbucket.b_c:jose4j: affected < 0.9.3; fixed in 0.9.3

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Maven org.bitbucket.b_c:jose4j: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on org.bitbucket.b_c:jose4j.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jgvc-jfgh-rjvv (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-jgvc-jfgh-rjvv lists affected ranges: Maven org.bitbucket.b_c:jose4j >=0 <0.9.3)

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