godot-mcp has Command Injection via unsanitized projectPath

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS

• CVE-2026-25546: 0.95% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 61.35 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact A Command Injection vulnerability in godot-mcp allows remote code execution. The executeOperation function passed user-controlled input (e.g., projectPath) directly to exec(), which spawns a shell. An attacker could inject shell metacharacters like $(command) or &calc to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the MCP server process. This affects any tool that accepts projectPath, including createscene, addnode, loadsprite, and others. Patches Fixed in version 0.1.1 by switching from exec() to execFile(), which does not invoke a shell. Workarounds None. Users should upgrade immediately. Resources - https://github.com/Coding-Solo/godot-mcp/issues/64 - https://github.com/Coding-Solo/godot-mcp/pull/67

Published by the source

4 Feb 2026, 20:02 UTC

Last modified by the source

8 Feb 2026, 03:14 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 12:42 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-8jx2-rhfh-q928

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-8jx2-rhfh-q928

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-25546

Advisory: godot-mcp has Command Injection via unsanitized projectPath
IDs: CVE-2026-25546, GHSA-8jx2-rhfh-q928
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-25546 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @coding-solo/godot-mcp 0.1.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @coding-solo/godot-mcp: affected < 0.1.1; fixed in 0.1.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @coding-solo/godot-mcp --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @coding-solo/godot-mcp.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8jx2-rhfh-q928 (OSV record GHSA-8jx2-rhfh-q928 lists affected ranges: npm @coding-solo/godot-mcp >=0 <0.1.1 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8jx2-rhfh-q928 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-8jx2-rhfh-q928 lists affected ranges: npm @coding-solo/godot-mcp >=0 <0.1.1)

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