Miniflux Media Proxy SSRF via /proxy endpoint allows access to internal network resources
CVE-2026-21885GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (miniflux.app/v2 2.2.16), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
- Affected
- <= 2.2.15
- Fixed in
- 2.2.16
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp lists affected ranges: Go miniflux.app/v2 >=0 <=2.2.15
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-21885: 0.30% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 22.80 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary Miniflux's media proxy endpoint (GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}) can be abused to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An authenticated user can cause Miniflux to generate a signed proxy URL for attacker-chosen media URLs embedded in feed entry content, including internal addresses (e.g., localhost, private RFC1918 ranges, or link-local metadata endpoints). Requesting the resulting /proxy/... URL makes Miniflux fetch and return the internal response. Details - Vulnerable route: GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL} (accessible without authentication, but requires a server-generated HMAC-signed URL) - Handler: internal/ui/proxy.go ((handler).mediaProxy) - Trigger: entry content is rewritten to proxy media URLs (e.g., mediaproxy.RewriteDocumentWithAbsoluteProxyURL(...)), producing signed /proxy/... URLs. - Root cause: the proxy validates the URL scheme and HMAC signature, but does not restrict target hosts/IPs. As a result, requests to…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-21885 Advisory: Miniflux Media Proxy SSRF via /proxy endpoint allows access to internal network resources IDs: CVE-2026-21885, GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-21885 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:14 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: miniflux.app/v2 2.2.16. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go miniflux.app/v2: affected <= 2.2.15; fixed in 2.2.16 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go miniflux.app/v2: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on miniflux.app/v2. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp lists affected ranges: Go miniflux.app/v2 >=0 <=2.2.15) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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