Bad documentation of error handling in ParseWithClaims can lead to potentially dangerous situations

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

2.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2024-51744: 0.58% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 48.00 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Unclear documentation of the error behavior in ParseWithClaims can lead to situation where users are potentially not checking errors in the way they should be. Especially, if a token is both expired and invalid, the errors returned by ParseWithClaims return both error codes. If users only check for the jwt.ErrTokenExpired using error.Is, they will ignore the embedded jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid and thus potentially accept invalid tokens. Fix We have back-ported the error handling logic from the v5 branch to the v4 branch. In this logic, the ParseWithClaims function will immediately return in "dangerous" situations (e.g., an invalid signature), limiting the combined errors only to situations where the signature is valid, but further validation failed (e.g., if the signature is valid, but is expired AND has the wrong audience). This fix is part of the 4.5.1 release. Workaround We are aware that this changes the behaviour of an established function and is not 100 % backwards…

Published by the source

4 Nov 2024, 23:22 UTC

Last modified by the source

12 Nov 2024, 21:32 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:05 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2024-51744

Advisory: Bad documentation of error handling in ParseWithClaims can lead to potentially dangerous situations
IDs: CVE-2024-51744, GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2024-51744 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:05 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Low (CVSS 2.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 4.5.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4: affected < 4.5.1; fixed in 4.5.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r lists affected ranges: Go github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 >=0 <4.5.1)

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