axum-core has no default limit put on request bodies

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS

• CVE-2022-3212: 1.00% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 62.94 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

<bytes::Bytes as axumcore::extract::FromRequest::fromrequest would not, by default, set a limit for the size of the request body. That meant if a malicious peer would send a very large (or infinite) body your server might run out of memory and crash. This also applies to these extractors which used Bytes::fromrequest internally: - axum::extract::Form - axum::extract::Json - String The fix is also in axum-core 0.3.0.rc.2 but 0.3.0.rc.1 is vulnerable. Because axum depends on axum-core it is vulnerable as well. The vulnerable versions of axum are <= 0.5.15 and 0.6.0.rc.1. axum = 0.5.16 and = 0.6.0.rc.2 does have the fix and are not vulnerable. The patched versions will set a 2 MB limit by default.

Published by the source

15 Sep 2022, 03:25 UTC

Last modified by the source

12 Jan 2023, 05:08 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:33 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-m77f-652q-wwp4

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2022-3212

Advisory: axum-core has no default limit put on request bodies
IDs: CVE-2022-3212, GHSA-m77f-652q-wwp4
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2022-3212 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:33 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: axum-core 0.3.0-rc.2, 0.2.8. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io axum-core: affected < 0.2.8; >= 0.3.0-rc.1, <= 0.3.0-rc.1; fixed in 0.2.8, 0.3.0-rc.2

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io axum-core: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on axum-core.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m77f-652q-wwp4 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-m77f-652q-wwp4 lists affected ranges: crates.io axum-core >=0 =0.3.0-rc.1 <=0.3.0-rc.1)

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