Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
58 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Using cProfile.runctx function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to cProfile.runctx function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.30 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using doctest.debugscript function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to doctest.debugscript function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.30 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC ``` from idlelib.pyshell import ModifiedInterpreter from types import SimpleNamespace class EvilIdlelibPyshellModifiedInterpreterRuncode: def reduce(self): payload = "import('os').system('whoami')" fake_self = SimpleNamespace( locals={}, tkconsole=SimpleNamespace( executing=False, beginexecuting=str, canceled=False, closing=False, showtraceback=str, endexecuting=str, stderr=None, text=SimpleNamespace(),…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.30 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.30 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using idlelib.run.Executive.runcode function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.run.Executive.runcode function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.30 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using lib2to3.pgen2.pgen.ParserGenerator.makelabel function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to lib2to3.pgen2.pgen.ParserGenerator.makelabel function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.30 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using ensurepip.runpip function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to ensurepip.runpip function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.30 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using torch.utils.bottleneck.\\main\\.runautogradprof function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils.bottleneck.main.runautogradprof function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.30 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using idlelib.calltip.getentity function, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.calltip.getentity function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.29 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using idlelib.calltip.Calltip.fetchtip, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.calltip.Calltip.fetchtip function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.29 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using code.InteractiveInterpreter.runcode, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to code.InteractiveInterpreter.runcode function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.29 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using idlelib.autocomplete.AutoComplete.fetchcompletions, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.autocomplete.AutoComplete.fetchcompletions function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.29 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using idlelib.autocomplete.AutoComplete.getentity, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.autocomplete.AutoComplete.getentity function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.29 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using idlelib.debugobj.ObjectTreeItem.SetText, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to idlelib.debugobj.ObjectTreeItem.SetText function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.29 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using lib2to3.pgen2.grammar.Grammar.loads, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to lib2to3.pgen2.grammar.Grammar.loads function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.29 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using profile.Profile.runctx, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to profile.Profile.runctx function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.29 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using profile.Profile.run, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to profile.Profile.run function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.29 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using trace.Trace.runctx, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to trace.Trace.runctx function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.29 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using trace.Trace.run, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to trace.Trace.run function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.29 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using torch.utils.configmodule.loadconfig function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker crafts the payload by calling the torch.utils.configmodule.loadconfig function via the reduce method. Then the victim checks whether the pickle file is safe using the Picklescan library. Because the library fails to detect any dangerous functions, the victim decides to pickle.load() this malicious file, leading to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.28 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using torch.jit.unsupportedtensorops.execWrapper function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.jit.unsupportedtensorops.execWrapper function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.28 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using torch.utils.data.datapipes.utils.decoder.basichandlers function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils.data.datapipes.utils.decoder.basichandlers function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.28 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using torch.utils.collectenv.run function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils.collectenv.run function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.28 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using torch.fx.experimental.symbolicshapes.ShapeEnv.evaluateguardsexpression function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.fx.experimental.symbolicshapes.ShapeEnv.evaluateguardsexpression function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.28 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Using torch.dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file. Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.dynamo.guards.GuardBuilder.get function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. PoC Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects. Corresponding https://github.com/FredericDT…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.0.28 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.