Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
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2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Rack::Session::Cookie incorrectly handles decryption failures when configured with secrets:. If cookie decryption fails, the implementation falls back to a default decoder instead of rejecting the cookie. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to supply a crafted session cookie that is accepted as valid session data without knowledge of any configured secret. Because this mechanism is used to load session state, an attacker can manipulate session contents and potentially gain unauthorized access. Details When secrets: is configured, Rack::Session::Cookie attempts to decrypt incoming session cookies using one of the configured encryptors. If all decrypt attempts fail, the implementation does not reject the cookie. Instead, it falls back to decoding the cookie using a default coder. This fallback path processes attacker-controlled cookie data as trusted session state. The behavior is implicit and occurs even when encrypted cookies are expected. The fallback decoder is applied…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.1.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
When using the Rack::Session::Pool middleware, simultaneous rack requests can restore a deleted rack session, which allows the unauthenticated user to occupy that session. Details Rack session middleware prepares the session at the beginning of request, then saves is back to the store with possible changes applied by host rack application. This way the session becomes to be a subject of race conditions in general sense over concurrent rack requests. Impact When using the Rack::Session::Pool middleware, and provided the attacker can acquire a session cookie (already a major issue), the session may be restored if the attacker can trigger a long running request (within that same session) adjacent to the user logging out, in order to retain illicit access even after a user has attempted to logout. Mitigation - Update to the latest version of rack-session, or - Ensure your application invalidates sessions atomically by marking them as logged out e.g., using a loggedout flag,…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.1.1 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.