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2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Impact A CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename. Attachment filenames are interpolated into the Content-Type and Content-Disposition header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing \r\n serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged Bcc: that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed. Details On the outbound side, MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment() sanitizes the filename only with iconv('UTF-8','US-ASCII//translit//ignore', $filename). CR and LF are valid US-ASCII, so they survive that filter, and the value is then written into the header verbatim via MimePart::setRawHeader(). A…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 4.0.2 or 3.0.6 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact An uncontrolled resource consumption / algorithmic complexity vulnerability affecting any application that parses untrusted email with this library. Three independent parsing paths are super-linear in cost, so a byte-size cap on the caller side does not bound the work done. A crafted message under 2 MB can consume seconds of CPU or hundreds of megabytes to multiple gigabytes of memory (leading to an out-of-memory kill), enabling denial of service. The parse is lazy, but the cost is paid on the first getAllParts() or content read. Details 1. Deep multipart nesting is O(depth²). MimeParserService::findContentBoundary() tests each content line against the current part and every ancestor via the recursive ParserMimePartProxy::setEndBoundaryFound(), so a nesting depth of D costs 1 + 2 + … + D comparisons. A ~600 KB message nested ~10,000 deep does not finish parsing in a minute. 2. Many sibling parts is O(n²). PartChildrenContainer::add() appends each child with…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 4.0.2 or 3.0.6 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.