Apache Camel: Permissive default ObjectInputFilter pattern admits java.net.** and enables DNS-based information disclosure
CVE-2026-42527 · GHSA-8h6p-jvhf-9hcr
- Affected
- Maven org.apache.camel:camel-sql >= 4.14.0, < 4.14.8; >= 4.18.0, < 4.18.3; >= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0
- Fixed in
- 4.21.04.14.84.18.3· Vendor fix available
- Issue
- Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel. The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering ('java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!', or the no-'javax.' variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive 'java.' glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object's class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 4.21.0, 4.18.3 or 4.14.8 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.