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2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
A memory leak can be caused in Netty's DNS codec by sending malicious DNS packets containing invalid domain names. Because the leak occurs incrementally per packet, sustained malicious requests will cause a gradual Denial of Service. Details Inside io.netty.handler.codec.dns.AbstractDnsRecord, the parsed domain name string is passed to IDN.toASCII(name). If the domain name contains characters that violate IDNA rules, IDN.toASCII throws an IllegalArgumentException. Because this exception occurs inside the constructor before the DnsRecord instance can assign the buffer to its content field for later release, the ByteBuf whose reference count was incremented (or newly allocated) is never released, resulting in a direct memory leak. There are several places where variants of this leak happen: - io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DefaultDnsRecordDecoder#decodeRecord(java.lang.String, io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsRecordType, int, long, io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf, int, int) invokes…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 4.2.16.Final or 4.1.136.Final by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Security Vulnerability Report: DNS Codec Input Validation Bypass in Netty (Encoder + Decoder) 1. Vulnerability Summary | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | Product | Netty | | Version | 4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions with codec-dns) | | Component | io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil | | Vulnerability Type | CWE-20: Improper Input Validation / CWE-626: Null Byte Interaction Error / CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | | Impact | DNS Cache Poisoning / Domain Validation Bypass / Denial of Service / Malformed DNS Packets | 2. Affected Components Both the encoder and decoder in the same file are affected: - io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil — encodeDomainName() method (lines 31-51): - No null byte validation in domain name labels - No per-label length validation (RFC 1035 max: 63 bytes) - No total domain name length validation (RFC 1035 max: 255 bytes) - Empty labels silently truncate the domain name - io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil — decodeDomainName()…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 4.2.13.Final or 4.1.133.Final by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.