Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Authors: Thai "thaidn" Duong Summary The following security vulnerabilities was discovered and reported to Amazon, affecting AWS KMS and all versions of AWS Encryption SDKs prior to version 2.0.0: Information leakage: an attacker can create ciphertexts that would leak the user’s AWS account ID, encryption context, user agent, and IP address upon decryption Ciphertext forgery: an attacker can create ciphertexts that are accepted by other users Robustness: an attacker can create ciphertexts that decrypt to different plaintexts for different users The first two bugs are somewhat surprising because they show that the ciphertext format can lead to vulnerabilities. These bugs (and the infamous alg: "None" bugs in JWT) belong to a class of vulnerabilities called in-band protocol negotiation. This is the second time we’ve found in-band protocol negotiation vulnerabilities in AWS cryptography libraries; see this bug in S3 Crypto SDK discovered by my colleague Sophie Schmieg. In JWT and S3 SDK…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.0.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Impact This advisory addresses several LOW severity issues with streaming signed messages and restricting processing of certain types of invalid messages. This update addresses an issue where certain invalid ECDSA signatures incorrectly passed validation. These signatures provide defense in depth and there is no impact on the integrity of decrypted plaintext. This ESDK supports a streaming mode where callers may stream the plaintext of signed messages before the ECDSA signature is validated. In addition to these signatures, the ESDK uses AES-GCM encryption and all plaintext is verified before being released to a caller. There is no impact on the integrity of the ciphertext or decrypted plaintext, however some callers may rely on the the ECDSA signature for non-repudiation. Without validating the ECDSA signature, an actor with trusted KMS permissions to decrypt a message may also be able to encrypt messages. This update introduces a new API for callers who wish to stream only unsigned…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.2.0 or 1.9.0 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.