Medium, CVSS 4.7GoPublished
Probo has an open redirect bypass via path normalization
CVE-2026-49820 · GHSA-x7qq-m748-8p2c
- Affected
- Go go.probo.inc/probo < 0.204.0
- Fixed in
- 0.204.0· Vendor fix available
- Issue
- Impact Probo's saferedirect package validates redirect URLs used across authentication flows (OIDC, SAML, session transfer, OAuth connectors, and trust-center magic links). The validator only inspected the second character of relative paths, so a URL like /../\evil.com passed validation because the second character is .. Go's http.Redirect normalizes this path to /\evil.com before setting the Location header. Browsers can interpret the backslash as a host separator and redirect the user to an external domain (https://evil.com), bypassing the intended same-origin restriction. This enables open-redirect phishing: an attacker can craft a continue parameter (or embed a malicious URL in a session-transfer token) that appears to originate from a trusted Probo domain but redirects victims elsewhere. Patches Fixed in go.probo.inc/probo by normalizing relative paths with path.Clean before validation, rejecting backslashes (including percent-encoded %5c) anywhere in the path, and re-checking…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.204.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.