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Go package

github.com/cloudflare/circl

Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.

Open advisories

4 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.

  1. Low, CVSS 2.9GoPublished

    CIRCL has an incorrect calculation in secp384r1 CombinedMult

    CVE-2026-1229 · GHSA-q9hv-hpm4-hj6x

    Affected
    • Go github.com/cloudflare/circl < 1.6.3
    Fixed in
    1.6.3· Vendor fix available
    Issue
    The CombinedMult function in the CIRCL ecc/p384 package (secp384r1 curve) produces an incorrect value for specific inputs. The issue is fixed by using complete addition formulas. ECDH and ECDSA signing relying on this curve are not affected. The bug was fixed in v1.6.3.

    Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.6.3 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.

    Sources:github.comSource checked Evidence →
  2. Low, CVSS 3.7GoPublished

    CIRCL-Fourq: Missing and wrong validation can lead to incorrect results

    CVE-2025-8556 · GHSA-2x5j-vhc8-9cwm

    Affected
    • Go github.com/cloudflare/circl < 1.6.1
    Fixed in
    1.6.1· Vendor fix available
    Issue
    Impact The CIRCL implementation of FourQ fails to validate user-supplied low-order points during Diffie-Hellman key exchange, potentially allowing attackers to force the identity point and compromise session security. Moreover, there is an incorrect point validation in ScalarMult can lead to incorrect results in the isEqual function and if a point is on the curve. Patches Version 1.6.1 (https://github.com/cloudflare/circl/tree/v1.6.1) mitigates the identified issues. We acknowledge Alon Livne (Botanica Software Labs) for the reported findings.

    Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.6.1 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.

    Sources:github.comSource checked Evidence →
  3. UnratedGoPublished

    CIRCL's Kyber: timing side-channel (kyberslash2)

    GHSA-9763-4f94-gfch

    Affected
    • Go github.com/cloudflare/circl < 1.3.7
    Fixed in
    1.3.7· Vendor fix available
    Issue
    Impact On some platforms, when an attacker can time decapsulation of Kyber on forged cipher texts, they could possibly learn (parts of) the secret key. Does not apply to ephemeral usage, such as when used in the regular way in TLS. Patches Patched in 1.3.7. References - kyberslash.cr.yp.to

    Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.3.7 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.

    Sources:github.comSource checked Evidence →
  4. Medium, CVSS 5.3GoPublished

    Improper random reading in CIRCL

    CVE-2023-1732 · GHSA-2q89-485c-9j2x

    Affected
    • Go github.com/cloudflare/circl < 1.3.3
    Fixed in
    1.3.3· Vendor fix available
    Issue
    Impact When sampling randomness for a shared secret, the implementation of Kyber and FrodoKEM, did not check whether crypto/rand.Read() returns an error. In rare deployment cases (error thrown by the Read() function), this could lead to a predictable shared secret. The tkn20 and blindrsa components did not check whether enough randomness was returned from the user provided randomness source. Typically the user provides crypto/rand.Reader, which in the vast majority of cases will always return the right number random bytes. In the cases where it does not, or the user provides a source that does not, the blinding for blindrsa is weak and integrity of the plaintext is not ensured in tkn20. Patches The fix was introduced in CIRCL v. 1.3.3

    Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.3.3 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.

    Sources:github.comSource checked Evidence →