github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis

Open advisories

2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.

1. Medium, CVSS 5.8GoAmendedPublished 2 Oct 2026

   Anubis: Policy bypass via client controlled X-Original-URI header

   CVE-2026-62314 · GHSA-6wcg-mqvh-fcvg

   Affected

   • Go github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis >= 1.22.0, < 1.26.0

   Fixed in

   1.26.0· Vendor fix available

   Issue

   Any HTTP client can bypass Anubis bot protection on the default configuration by adding a single request header. No challenge needs to be solved. Affected versions: v1.22.0 through v1.25.0 (introduced in commit d1d631a, PR #1015) The root cause is in lib/policy/checker.go, PathChecker.Check(): The header value comes directly from the client request. The middleware chain never strips it. In reverse proxy mode an attacker fully controls it. The default policy imports data/common/keep-internet-working.yaml, which contains path-only ALLOW rules with no other conditions: When X-Original-URI matches one of those regexes, the rule fires as ALLOW and the request is forwarded upstream without any challenge or JWT check. Proof of concept Normal request, gets challenged: Bypass, gets upstream content: The first command returns the Anubis challenge page title. The second returns the real site title directly, with no cookie set and no challenge issued. Verified live against anubis.techaro.lol.…

   Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.26.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.

   Sources:osv.dev (1)osv.dev (2)github.com (3)Source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:29 UTCEvidence →
2. Medium, CVSS 5.1GoPublished 30 Oct 2025

   Anubis vulnerable to possible XSS via redir parameter when using subrequest auth mode

   CVE-2025-64716 · GHSA-cf57-c578-7jvv

   Affected

   • Go github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis < 1.23.0

   Fixed in

   1.23.0· Vendor fix available

   Issue

   When using subrequest authentication, Anubis did not perform validation of the redirect URL and redirects user to any URL scheme. While most modern browsers do not allow a redirect to javascript: URLs, it could still trigger dangerous behavior in some cases. GET https://example.com/.within.website/?redir=javascript:alert() responds with Location: javascript:alert(). Impact Anybody with a subrequest authentication seems affected. Using javascript: URLs will probably be blocked by most modern browsers, but using custom protocols for third-party applications might still trigger dangerous operations. Note This was originally reported by @mbiesiad against Weblate.

   Recommended action: Upgrade to 1.23.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.

   Sources:github.comSource checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:13 UTCEvidence →