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skilo

Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.

Open advisories

1 actionable advisory, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.

  1. Medium, CVSS 6.5crates.ioAmendedPublished

    skilo add follows symbolic links, allowing arbitrary local file disclosure from a malicious skill source

    GHSA-6xx4-9wp6-65p7

    Affected
    • crates.io skilo >= 0.5.0, < 0.11.1
    Fixed in
    0.11.1· Vendor fix available
    Issue
    Impact skilo add installs a skill by recursively copying the skill directory into the target skills directory. The copy routine (copydirall) classified each entry with std::fs::DirEntry::filetype() — which does not follow symlinks — and then copied non-directory entries with std::fs::copy(), which does dereference symlinks. As a result, a skill containing a symbolic link such as reference.txt - /home/<user/.ssh/idrsa was copied as a regular file whose contents are the link's target. A malicious skill source — for example a git repository installed via skilo add github.com/<attacker/<skills, or a local path — could read arbitrary files readable by the user running skilo add (SSH keys, cloud credentials, .env files, etc.) and place their contents inside the installed skill directory, where the user or their agent may later read, share, or sync them. This is arbitrary local file disclosure (CWE-59 / CWE-61, symlink following) triggered by installing an untrusted skills source. Patches…

    Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.11.1 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.

    Sources:osv.dev (1)github.com (2)Source checked Evidence →