High, CVSS 7.5crates.ioPublished
Decompression bomb in ruzstd: a tiny input can exhaust memory (OOM)
- Affected
- crates.io ruzstd >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.9.1
- Fixed in
- 0.9.1· Vendor fix available
- Issue
- A crafted `.zst` input under 128 KB can force `ruzstd` to allocate several gigabytes at once, crashing the process with an out-of-memory condition. Since `ruzstd` is a decoder for untrusted input, a single small file is enough to take down anything decoding it. The compressed size of a block was capped at 128 KB, but a compressed block's decompressed size was never checked against `Block_Maximum_Size = min(Window_Size, 128 KiB)` (RFC 8878). In `execute_sequences` the output was built with no running bound and no flush between blocks, so one block could expand to gigabytes — bypassing both the configured window-size limit and the block-by-block streaming that would otherwise release memory. (A related `u32` counter overflow on such a block caused an additional panic.) This is a denial of service only; memory access stays in bounds (no corruption, no RCE). `ruzstd` is also built as a dependency of the Rust standard library via `rustc-dep-of-std`; in the toolchain it is used only to…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.9.1 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.