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2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
Registry-installed nono packs are expected to be verified from local provenance metadata before they are used. Two files are relevant: - ~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json - ~/.config/nono/packages/<namespace/<pack/.nono-trust.bundle Testing shows that nono fails closed when a pack has a trust bundle but no lockfile entry. However, if the trust bundle is also absent, the same pack can load successfully. Deleting security metadata should not make a pack easier to run. Affected behavior Observed with always-further/claude: 1. Delete ~/.config/nono/packages/lockfile.json. Result: 2. Delete ~/.config/nono/packages/always-further/claude/.nono-trust.bundle. Result: the profile loads successfully. 3. Restore .nono-trust.bundle while the lockfile is still absent. Result: Impact If both the lockfile entry and trust bundle are absent, nono may accept an installed registry pack without artifact hash verification or provenance verification. This is especially important for…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.61.3 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
The nono Landlock/seccomp policies allow access to local Unix domain sockets (concrete and abstract). This allows an easy sandbox escape by talking to the per-user systemd dbus socket. Threat scenario: Running Aider, Claude Code, OpenCode or similar tools with "allow bash" policy so that it can invoke arbitrary host tools like make, gcc, etc. to write code. Reproducer Here, instead of running a tool like opencode or claude one can just invoke systemd-run, but this is something an agent could be tricked into doing: Impact Complete sandbox escape. The unsandboxed sibling process can write anywhere the user can write, spawn arbitrary processes with network access, etc. Maintainer Context This issue allows a process running inside the sandbox to escape confinement by interacting with local user-scoped IPC mechanisms and regain the authority already held by the invoking user or service account. The issue impacts the sandbox’s confinement and blast-radius reduction guarantees for…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.55.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.