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3 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
During message encoding, hickory-proto's BinEncoder stores pointers to labels that are candidates for name compression in a Vec<(usize, Vec<u8). The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan. A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. Reporter Qifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.26.1 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. Details verifydnskeyrrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verifyrrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verifydefaultrrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.25.0-alpha.5 (pre-release) or 0.24.3 by release line, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. Details verifydnskeyrrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verifyrrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verifydefaultrrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.24.3 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.