Open actionable advisories and recorded vendor fixes. This public package view has no inventory attached and cannot establish whether your deployment is affected. A vendor fix never resolves your finding; verify your installed version and the source guidance.
Open advisories
5 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
A vulnerability exists in the Community Tier of Harden-Runner that allows bypassing the egress-policy: block network restriction using DNS over HTTPS (DoH). Harden-Runner secures GitHub Actions workflows on runners by applying network policies, including an allowed-endpoints configuration that limits outbound traffic to specified domains and ports (e.g., github.com:443). In egress-policy: block mode, non-compliant connections are intercepted and denied. This vulnerability exploits DoH, a protocol that encapsulates DNS queries within HTTPS requests. By crafting a DNS query that embeds exfiltrated data as a subdomain (e.g., encoding the runner's hostname into a label), an attacker can route the request through a permitted HTTPS endpoint like dns.google (8.8.8.8's DoH service). The resolver processes the query and forwards it to the attacker's controlled domain, achieving exfiltration without directly accessing the blocked destination. This evades Harden-Runner's domain-based…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.16.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
A vulnerability exists in the Community Tier of Harden-Runner that allows bypassing the egress-policy: block network restriction using DNS queries over TCP. Harden-Runner enforces egress policies on GitHub runners by filtering outbound connections at the network layer. When egress-policy: block is enabled with a restrictive allowed-endpoints list (e.g., only github.com:443), all non-compliant traffic should be denied. However, DNS queries over TCP, commonly used for large responses or fallback from UDP, are not adequately restricted. Tools like dig can explicitly initiate TCP-based DNS queries (+tcp flag) without being blocked. This vulnerability requires the attacker to already have code execution capabilities within the GitHub Actions workflow. The Enterprise Tier of Harden-Runner is not affected by this vulnerability. Impact When Harden-Runner is configured with egress-policy: block and a restrictive allowed-endpoints list, an attacker with existing code execution…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.16.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
A security vulnerability has been identified in the Harden-Runner GitHub Action (Community Tier) that allows outbound network connections to evade audit logging. Specifically, outbound traffic using the sendto, sendmsg, and sendmmsg socket system calls can bypass detection and logging when using egress-policy: audit. Note: This vulnerability only affects audit mode. When using egress-policy: block, these connections are properly blocked. It requires the attacker to already have code execution capabilities within the GitHub Actions workflow (e.g., through workflow injection or compromised dependencies) Affected Versions - Harden-Runner Community Tier: All versions prior to v2.14.2 - Harden-Runner Enterprise Tier: NOT AFFECTED Severity Medium - This vulnerability affects audit logging capabilities but requires the attacker to already have code execution within the workflow. Impact When Harden-Runner is configured in audit mode (egress-policy: audit), attackers with the ability…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.14.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Harden-Runner includes a policy option disable-sudo to prevent the GitHub Actions runner user from using sudo. This is implemented by removing the runner user from the sudoers file. However, this control can be bypassed as the runner user, being part of the docker group, can interact with the Docker daemon to launch privileged containers or access the host filesystem. This allows the attacker to regain root access or restore the sudoers file, effectively bypassing the restriction. For an attacker to bypass this control, they would first need the ability to run their malicious code (e.g., by a supply chain attack similar to tj-actions or exploiting a Pwn Request vulnerability)) on the runner. This vulnerability has been fixed in Harden-Runner version v2.12.0. Impact An attacker with the ability to run their malicious code on a runner configured with disable-sudo: true can escalate privileges to root using Docker, defeating the intended security control. Affected Configuration…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.12.0 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
Versions of step-security/harden-runner prior to v2.10.2 contain multiple command injection weaknesses via environment variables that could potentially be exploited under specific conditions. However, due to the current execution order of pre-steps in GitHub Actions and the placement of harden-runner as the first step in a job, the likelihood of exploitation is low as the Harden-Runner action reads the environment variable during the pre-step stage. There are no known exploits at this time. Details 1. setup.ts:169 [1] performs execSync with a command that gets invoked after interpretation by the shell. This command includes an interpolated process.env.USER variable, which an attacker could modify (without actually creating a new user) to inject arbitrary shell expressions into this execSync. This may or may not be likely in practice, but I believe the hygienic way to perform the underlying operation is to use execFileSync or similar and bypass the underlying shell evaluation.…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.10.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.