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2 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
@tinacms/auth's isAuthorized(req) decides authorization by validating the caller's bearer token against https://identity.tinajs.io/v2/apps/${req.query.clientID}/currentUser, where the clientID comes from the request and is never compared to the site's own configured TinaCloud app id. The function answers "is this token a verified user of whatever app the caller named?" instead of "is this token a verified user of THIS site?" Any TinaCloud user can create their own free app, get a valid token for it, and send ?clientID=<their-own-app plus Authorization: <their-own-token to a victim self-hosted site. The victim's authorized callback runs const user = await isAuthorized(req); return user && user.verified, which returns true, and the victim authorizes the attacker. The attacker holds no account on the victim and needs no victim interaction. With the media handlers this grants read, upload, and delete on the victim's media bucket. When the backend uses…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 15.0.1 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
The production media handler shipped by next-tinacms-s3 (createMediaHandler in packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts) accepts an attacker-chosen ?key= query parameter and returns an AWS-signed PutObject URL whose Key is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured mediaRoot. The same handler's DELETE branch reads objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1] and dispatches a DeleteObjectCommand for that exact key, again unbounded by mediaRoot. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied authorized() predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the entire S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents mediaRoot as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in next-tinacms-dos, next-tinacms-azure, and next-tinacms-cloudinary, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend. Project:…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 14.0.4 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.