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3 actionable advisories, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.
The HTTP mode of `@tsparticles/mcp-server` creates a single stateful `StreamableHTTPServerTransport` instance and reuses it for all clients. The first anonymous client that initializes the MCP endpoint claims the shared transport state, and later clients cannot create their own sessions. This was verified on `v4.3.0` at commit `0266d469aa2d719cb66a9c6bf09aded4186ec17c`. The same singleton transport pattern is still present in `v4.3.1` and current `main`. Affected Code The server creates one shared transport before accepting requests: const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({ sessionIdGenerator: () => randomUUID(), }); const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => { ... await transport.handleRequest(req, res, parsedBody); }); Because the same transport object is reused across all requests, the first successful `initialize` call changes the state for all later clients. Reproduction Send two independent `initialize` requests without a prior…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 4.3.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
The HTTP mode of `@tsparticles/mcp-server` parses incoming `/mcp` request bodies with `JSON.parse()` outside a request-local error boundary. A single malformed JSON request causes the async request handler to throw and terminates the Node.js process. This was verified on `v4.3.0` at commit `0266d469aa2d719cb66a9c6bf09aded4186ec17c`. Version `4.3.1` appears to fix this by returning HTTP 400 for invalid JSON. Affected Code The vulnerable handler is: if (req.method === "POST" && req.url === "/mcp") { const body = await new Promise ((resolve, reject) => { const chunks: Buffer[] = []; req.on("data", (chunk) => chunks.push(Buffer.from(chunk))); req.on("end", () => resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8"))); req.on("error", reject); }); const parsedBody = body ? JSON.parse(body) : undefined; await transport.handleRequest(req, res, parsedBody); } The `JSON.parse()` call is not wrapped in `try/catch`. Reproduction Start the HTTP server and send this malformed request:…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 4.3.1 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.
The HTTP server mode of `@tsparticles/mcp-server` accumulates all incoming request body chunks into an in-memory `Buffer[]` array with no size limit before calling `JSON.parse`. An unauthenticated remote attacker can stream an arbitrarily large body to `POST /mcp`, exhausting the Node.js process memory and causing a Denial of Service. The official Docker image ships with HTTP mode enabled by default (`--port 3000` on `0.0.0.0`), making this exploitable without any special configuration in containerized deployments. Details The vulnerability exists in `integrations/mcp-server/src/index.ts` at lines 399–407. The `POST /mcp` request handler resolves a `Promise` that pushes every incoming data chunk into a `Buffer[]` array without checking the cumulative size, a `Content-Length` header, or any other guard: ```ts // integrations/mcp-server/src/index.ts:399-407 if (req.method === "POST" && req.url === "/mcp") { const body = await new Promise ((resolve, reject) => { const…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 4.3.1 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.