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@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp

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1 actionable advisory, newest first. Withdrawn advisories and news are excluded. Coverage is partial.

  1. High, CVSS 7.1npmAmendedPublished

    @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp has a path traversal in vault.batch tool that allows arbitrary file write outside intended vault directory

    CVE-2026-61647 · GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq

    Affected
    • npm @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp >= 1.6.0, < 2.0.3
    Fixed in
    2.0.3· Vendor fix available
    Issue
    The vaultbatch MCP tool (and the equivalent POST /batch-to-vault HTTP endpoint) accepted a caller-supplied vaultdir path that was passed directly to path.resolve() + fs.mkdir() with no containment check. A caller — or a prompt-injected LLM driving the MCP — could therefore create directories and write .md / .json answer files anywhere the server process can write. The slugprefix parameter had a parallel, smaller traversal vector: it was concatenated into the filename without sanitization, so a prefix containing / or .. could escape the resolved vault directory through the filename component. Impact File write (markdown + JSON sidecars) to any location writable by the server process. The written files are inert content (no code execution by themselves), but in a multi-user context — or when the MCP server is driven by an LLM that has read untrusted content (prompt injection) — this allows an attacker to plant files in sensitive locations (autostart folders, shell startup…

    Recommended action: Upgrade to 2.0.3 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.

    Sources:github.com (1)osv.dev (2)Source checked Evidence →