UnratednpmAmendedPublished
@cardano402/mcp-server missing spending limits, LAN-exposed HTTP transport, and SSRF via catalog.server.url
GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446
- Affected
- npm @cardano402/mcp-server <= 0.1.1
- Fixed in
- 0.1.2· Vendor fix available
- Issue
- @cardano402/mcp-server versions <= 0.1.1 ship three security gaps that can lead to unauthorized fund movement when the package is used as designed (an MCP server exposing Cardano payment tools to an Impact 1. No spending limits on signed payments An LLM (or prompt-injected LLM) calling tools registered by the MCP server can invoke them in a loop. Each call signs a real Cardano transaction for the catalog-advertised amount. There is no per-call cap, daily ceiling, MCP elicitation/confirmation step, or recipient allowlist. The MAINNET=true env-var guardrail can be bypassed by any LLM with shell-tool access. Worst case: full wallet drain. 2. HTTP transport binds 0.0.0.0 without authentication cardano402-mcp --transport http listens on all interfaces with no Origin allowlist, no bearer-token requirement, and no CORS check. Anyone on the same LAN can POST MCP tools/call and trigger signed payments from the operator's wallet. 3. SSRF via catalog.server.url A malicious catalog can…
Recommended action: Upgrade to 0.1.2 or later, then redeploy and verify.A vendor fix does not resolve your finding until you verify it in your own systems.