eazip: symlink-target validation checks the wrong argument, allowing extraction path escapes on Windows

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

8.6 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

When extracting archives, `eazip` validates symlink entries before writing them. The validation function `validate_symlink()` (`src/utils/mod.rs`) scans for backslash and NUL bytes, but passes the symlink's *name* where the symlink's *target* was intended: ```rust memchr2(b'\\', b'\0', name.as_bytes()) // should be target.as_bytes() ``` As a result, symlink *targets* containing backslash or NUL bytes pass validation. On Windows, backslash is a path separator, so targets such as `..\..\..\Windows\system32\evil.exe` also defeat the remaining depth check, which splits on `/` only. A crafted archive can therefore create symlinks that resolve outside the extraction directory — including UNC targets such as `\\host\share\...` — redirecting writes to arbitrary filesystem locations chosen by the attacker. Applications that extract untrusted archives with `eazip` on Windows targets are affected; on Unix targets backslash is not a separator, which limits exposure there. The vulnerability was…

Published by the source

7 Nov 2026, 12:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

12 Nov 2026, 08:00 UTC

Source last checked

13 Nov 2026, 06:40 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 13 Nov 2026

   Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0503

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# Patch Next advisory brief: rustsec-2026-0503

Advisory: eazip: symlink-target validation checks the wrong argument, allowing extraction path escapes on Windows
IDs: rustsec-2026-0503
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0503 (revision 1, source checked 13 Nov 2026, 06:40 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.6)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: eazip 0.2.7. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io eazip: affected >= 0.2.5, < 0.2.7; fixed in 0.2.7

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io eazip: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on eazip.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0503 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0503 lists affected ranges: crates.io eazip >=0.2.5 <0.2.7 (fixed))

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