Signature::from_der reads a signature with bytes after it, a wrong sequence length or an unneeded zero as the signature

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

`Signature::from_der` read a DER-encoded ECDSA signature leniently. It read as the signature: the signature followed by other bytes; a sequence length shorter than its contents, or longer with bytes after them (a length byte with its high bit set among them); and an R or S preceded by a zero byte it did not need. It read a lone-zero R or S as zero. `messages::verify`, `compat::bsm::verify_message_der`, `auth::Certificate::verify`, `auth::VerifiableCertificate::verify`, `wallet::ProtoWallet::verify_signature` and `kvstore::KVStoreInterpreter::verify_signature` read through it, and each verified such a form of a valid signature. Given one signature a key holder made, anyone could produce other byte strings that verify as that signature over the same data. No form verifies over other data: an application that acts on the verdict alone is not affected; one that compares, hashes or stores a signature's bytes is. 0.8.6 refuses each form as `Error::InvalidSignature`. A signature's bytes are…

Published by the source

11 Nov 2026, 12:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

12 Nov 2026, 08:00 UTC

Source last checked

13 Nov 2026, 06:40 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 13 Nov 2026

   Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0499

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-9c8r-76f3-m426

Advisory: Signature::from_der reads a signature with bytes after it, a wrong sequence length or an unneeded zero as the signature
IDs: GHSA-9c8r-76f3-m426
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0499 (revision 1, source checked 13 Nov 2026, 06:40 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: bsv-rs 0.9.0-beta.7.0, 0.8.6. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io bsv-rs: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.8.6; >= 0.9.0-beta.1, < 0.9.0-beta.7.0; fixed in 0.9.0-beta.7.0, 0.8.6

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io bsv-rs: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on bsv-rs.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0499 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0499 lists affected ranges: crates.io bsv-rs >=0.0.0-0 =0.9.0-beta.1 <0.9.0-beta.7.0 (fixed))

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