Transaction readers accept trailing bytes, so a parsed transaction can carry another transaction id

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

EPSS

No dated EPSS signal available.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

`Transaction::from_binary` and `Transaction::from_hex` read one transaction from the front of their input, did not check that the input ended there, and kept the whole input as the transaction's cached serialization: `to_binary`, `to_hex` and `id()` then answered for bytes that are not the transaction's. `Transaction::from_json`, given a `hex` field, reads it through `from_hex` and answers the same. `from_ef`, `from_hex_ef` and `parse_script_offsets` also read a prefix. An application that takes bytes or hex from outside, parses them with these readers and then uses `id()` or the serialization could be given one transaction under another identity: the same parsed fields, a different id. An application that passes them only bytes it produced or has already checked is not affected. 0.8.5 refuses a byte after the transaction; `Transaction::from_reader` reads from the front of a longer buffer. Where upgrading is not possible, parse with `Transaction::from_binary`, call…

Published by the source

10 Nov 2026, 12:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

12 Nov 2026, 08:11 UTC

Source last checked

13 Nov 2026, 06:30 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 13 Nov 2026

   Amended from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0500

2. Revision 1 · created · 13 Nov 2026

   Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0498

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# Patch Next advisory brief: GHSA-j8hr-pjhm-6h27

Advisory: Transaction readers accept trailing bytes, so a parsed transaction can carry another transaction id
IDs: GHSA-j8hr-pjhm-6h27
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/rustsec-2026-0498 (revision 2, source checked 13 Nov 2026, 06:30 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: bsv-rs 0.9.0-beta.7.0, 0.8.5. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io bsv-rs: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.8.5; >= 0.9.0-beta.1, < 0.9.0-beta.7.0; fixed in 0.9.0-beta.7.0, 0.8.5

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io bsv-rs: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on bsv-rs.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0498 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0498 lists affected ranges: crates.io bsv-rs >=0.0.0-0 =0.9.0-beta.1 <0.9.0-beta.7.0 (fixed))
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0500 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0500 lists affected ranges: crates.io bsv-rs >=0.0.0-0 =0.9.0-beta.1 <0.9.0-beta.7.0 (fixed))

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